President Anwar El Sadat of Egypt is a highly controversial figure in the Middle East. Honored as a prophet and cursed as a traitor, Sadat received both appreciation and disrespect. Against much opposition, he reached a peace agreement with Israel, which included official recognition of the State of Israel. This was enough to bring him many enemies in Egypt, but also in other Arab nations.
Being modest and proud, willing to be underestimated and capable of building confidence with his political opponents, Sadat implemented his vision for Egypt. As he assumed power, he realized the importance of being successful in the foreign affairs and popular at home and he managed to perform gestures on the domestic scene to strengthen Egypt's international position.
Sadat's visit to Israel on November 19-21, 1977 signified the significant confluence of a fertile setting for diplomatic improvements in the Arab-Israeli conflict and a leader who saw how he could use that setting to achieve his goals.
Arab nations wanted to regain control on the land that Israel dominated since the Six Day War in 1967. Since 1967, all peace negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis had focused on the fundamental issue of land for peace. For Sadat and for several other Arab leaders, it was clear that if Egypt wanted to regain the Sinai Peninsula, it would have to walk on the road of diplomacy.
Sadat had also realized the increasing degree of US interest and involvement in the peace process in the Middle East. After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the United States had interfered, in a way, into the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement negotiations and has played a key role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy since then. However, Sadat knew that US increasing interest in the peace settlements in the Middle East coincided with a remarkable convergence of an incredible triad of people whose personalities, ideas, styles and shared passion allowed an interconnection that made the peace process feasible in 1978 at Camp David. US President Jimmy Carter, Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin were three people that could understand each other. Yet, only Sadat capitalized on that environment.
Sadat could have avoided his visit to Israel considering the special relationship between the United States and Israel. He could have pleaded to the US President, who would then plead his case to Israel. However, Sadat loved surprises in international diplomacy as he had done in 1972 when he forced the Soviets out of Cairo with no warning. In effect, he went to Israel to move things forward and to avoid a negotiating settlement in Geneva. He wanted to get done with it; himself; for his country.
Sadat was assassinated on October 7, 1981 that marked Egypt's Armed Forces Day, by Islamist fanatics who opposed the recognition of Israel.
The peace with Israel granted Sadat with international respect, recognition and eventually the Nobel Peace Prize that he shared with Israeli Prime Minister Begin in 1978. But it also confused and estranged many people at home and in the wider Arab world. The peace he concluded with Israel remains a highly emotive issue in Egypt because of the primitive hatred many Egyptians feel against Israel, a hatred that becomes even stronger considering the strongly held belief that the State of Israel was created on the stolen land of the Palestinians by the Zionists.
Furthermore, Sadat had promised that the peace settlements with Israel would bring prosperity to Egypt, which never happened. Egypt's economy, although it shows some encouraging signs, is still in economic turmoil and has not produced prosperity for a large number of its citizens mostly because there is a huge gap between the rich and the poor. Peace with the Israelis has secured Egypt's borders, but has left the Palestinians with less to expect in regards to future peace with Israel. On the other hand, the political and economic reforms he did as soon as he inherited power from Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) continue to shape the Egyptian society.
Until Sadat's visit to Israel, no Arab country had recognized Israel's right to exist. Sadat confirmed that true peacemakers have the courage to confront both their political opponents and domestic extremists. On his way to Jerusalem and later to Camp David, he knew that he would be probably forced to sacrifice the support of two of his foreign ministers in order to push forward his vision of peace.
Secondly, Sadat's legacy highlights both the challenges and opportunities deriving from official peace agreements between governments. Unfortunately, his tragic and sudden assassination by Islamic extremists disrupted the hope that the citizens of Egypt and Israel would develop a thriving and warm relationship. The government of Hosni Mubarak, who rose to power after Sadat's assassination, has halted, and in fact reversed, nearly all efforts at normalization. The vision of Sadat is betrayed by the state-controlled media in Egypt that routinely broadcast anti-Israeli messages. On the other hand, the basic terms of the treaty have been preserved as not a single Israeli soldier has had to be dispatched to fight on the Egyptian front.
For many, Sadat's true legacy is a series of processes that are still going on such as the Arab-Israeli peace process, economic development, and political liberalization in Egypt. Although he is remembered for his daring leap toward peace, his ultimate legacy is vague. He re-established militant Islam because as he had no power base when he succeeded Nasser, he encouraged Islamists and appealed to their support to dominate on his secular and left opponents. He also featured the Islamic Sharia in the constitution and he used political Islam during the Cold War to fight against his Communist opponents. Today, Egypt has peace on its eastern border, and doesn't really face any serious military threat from any direction. Besides, it has emerged as the leading state in the region and the broader Arab world.
For Sadat, three wars with Israel (1948, 1967 and 1973) were more than enough for his country that was trying to recover economically. Although the peace negotiations he initiated did not end the Arab-Israeli conflict, nor did they create an affluent Egypt, the peace treaty with Israel allowed Egypt to benefit from an economic and military package from the United States equal to $1.3billion per year, beyond any sort of economic or humanitarian aid that totaled more than $25 billion for the period between 1979 and 1997. Since 1979, Egypt has been the second major beneficiary, after Israel, of U.S. foreign assistance.
by: Christina_Pomoni
